Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti-Tax Evasion Program*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casaburi, Lorenzo; Troiano, Ugo
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv041
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 273-314
• 关键词: politicians; voters; determinants; ENFORCEMENT; performance; taxation; audit; hand

摘要

The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and non-monetary benefits for non-evaders and an increase in local government expenditures. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8% increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and the quality of the government.