Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bierbrauer, Felix J.; Boyer, Pierre C.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Mannheim; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv033
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 461-518
• 关键词: Optimal income taxation; social preferences; large numbers; tax; redistribution; MODEL; RISK; LAW; incentives; provision

摘要

We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision, or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share maximizers. They can propose any policy that is resource-feasible and incentive-compatible. They can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate. We prove two main results. First, the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus-maximizing and hence first-best Pareto-efficient. Second, there is a surplus-maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare-maximizing policy. Thus, in our model, policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible.