Collective Brand Reputation

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Nocke, Volker; Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Surrey; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/720986
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Moral hazard; firm; extension; example; signal; LAW

摘要

We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting trade-off yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.