The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: De Haan, Monique; Gautier, Pieter A.; Oosterbeek, Hessel; van der Klaauw, Bas
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/721230
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: choice; preferences; admissions

摘要

We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. We find that deferred acceptance (DA) results in higher mean welfare than the adaptive Boston mechanism. This is due to students making strategic mistakes. The welfare gain of a switch from actual Boston to DA is over 90% of the welfare difference between actual Boston and optimal (proxy) Boston. Disadvantaged and lower-ability students would benefit most from such a switch.