Optimal Deposit Insurance

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Davila, Eduardo; Goldstein, Itay
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/723633
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Bank runs; welfare; panics; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; fragility; MODEL; cost

摘要

This paper studies the optimal determination of deposit insurance when bank runs are possible. We show that the welfare impact of changes in the level of deposit insurance coverage can be generally expressed in terms of a small number of sufficient statistics, which include the level of losses in specific scenarios and the probability of bank failure. We characterize the wedges that determine the optimal ex ante regulation, which map to asset- and liability-side regulation. We demonstrate how to employ our framework in an application to the most recent change in coverage in the United States, which took place in 2008.