Political Centralization and Government Accountability*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
• 署名单位: Free University of Bozen-Bolzano; University of Barcelona; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv035
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 381-422
• 关键词: electoral competition; decentralization; CORRUPTION; side

摘要

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.