Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Chen, Yi-Chun; Holden, Richard; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Wilkening, Tom
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University of New South Wales Sydney; Singapore Management University; University of International Business & Economics; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/721153
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: subgame-perfect implementation; public-goods; virtual implementation; Nash equilibrium; mechanism design; INFORMATION; RENEGOTIATION; rationality; investments; Robustness

摘要

We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that an SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided holdup problem with ex ante investment.