Pareto-Improving Segmentation of Multiproduct Markets

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Haghpanah, Nima; Siegel, Ron
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/722932
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: price-discrimination; disclosure; monopoly; privacy

摘要

We investigate whether a market served by a multiproduct monopolistic seller can be segmented in a way that benefits all consumers and the seller. The seller can offer a different product menu in each market segment, combining second- and third-degree price discrimination. We show that markets for which profit maximization leads to inefficiency can, generically, be segmented into two market segments in a way that increases the surplus of all consumers weakly and of some consumers and the seller strictly. Our constructive proof is based on deriving implications of binding incentive compatibility constraints when profit maximization implies inefficiency.