The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fleurbaey, Marc; Ponthiere, Gregory
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/724318
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2556-2594
• 关键词: free entry; MARKET; RESPONSIBILITY; COMPETITION; strategies; selection; EVOLUTION; FIRMS

摘要

The stakeholder (or responsible) firm maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of the surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). Although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely on constrained profit maximization. Unconstrained profit maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. Long-term entry decisions should rely on profit modified by Pigouvian pricing of externalities, and this result provides a novel justification for the polluter-pays principle.