Selective-Memory Equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo; Strack, Philipp
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/731412
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3978-4020
• 关键词: DECISION-MAKING; MODEL; JUDGMENT; confidence; gamblers; mood; RISK

摘要

We study agents who are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred. To understand the long-run effects of selective memory, we propose selective-memory equilibrium. We show that if the agent's behavior converges, their limit strategy is a selective-memory equilibrium, and we provide a sufficient condition for behavior to converge. We use this equilibrium concept to explore the consequences of several well-documented biases. We also show that there is a close connection between selective-memory equilibria and the outcomes of misspecified learning.