Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry-Evidence from the Notary Profession

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Verboven, Frank; Yontcheva, Biliana
• 署名单位: KU Leuven; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Hamburg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/730549
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3658-3707
• 关键词: product variety; QUALITY; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; selection

摘要

We study entry restrictions in a private monopoly: the Latin notary system. Under this widespread system, the state grants notaries exclusive rights to certify important economic transactions, including real estate. To uncover the current policy goals behind the geographic entry restrictions, we develop an empirical entry model that incorporates a spatial demand model and a multioutput production model. We find that the entry restrictions serve primarily producer interests and give only a small weight to consumer surplus. We show how reform would generate considerable welfare improvements and imply a substantial redistribution toward consumers without threatening geographic coverage.