MISSED SALES AND THE PRICING OF ANCILLARY GOODS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomes, Renato; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjy016
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2097-2169
• 关键词: CONSUMER-PROTECTION; SALIENCE; monopoly; CHOICE; MODEL

摘要

Firms often sell a basic good as well as ancillary ones. Hold-up concerns have led to ancillary good regulations, such as transparency and price caps. The hold-up narrative, however, runs counter to evidence in many retail settings where ancillary good prices are set below cost (e.g., free shipping or limited card surcharging in countries where the no-surcharge rule was lifted). We argue that the key to unifying these conflicting narratives is that the seller may absorb partly or fully the ancillary good's cost so as not to miss sales on the basic good. A supplier with market power on the ancillary good market then takes advantage of cost absorption and jacks up its wholesale price. Hold-ups occur only when consumers are initially uninformed or naive about the drip price and shopping costs are high. The price of the basic good then acts as a signal of the drip price, since a high markup on the basic good makes the firm more wary of missed sales. Regardless of whether consumers are informed, uninformed but rational, or naive, mandating price transparency and banning loss-making on the ancillary good leads to (i) an efficient consumption of the ancillary good, and (ii) a reduction of its wholesale price, generating strict welfare gains.