UNIFORM PRICING IN US RETAIL CHAINS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DellaVigna, Stefano; Gentzkow, Matthew
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjz019
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2011-2084
• 关键词: MARKET POWER; prices; COMPETITION; sales

摘要

We show that most U.S. food, drugstore, and mass-merchandise chains charge nearly uniform prices across stores, despite wide variation in consumer demographics and competition. Demand estimates reveal substantial within-chain variation in price elasticities and suggest that the median chain sacrifices $16 million of annual profit relative to a benchmark of optimal prices. In contrast, differences in average prices between chains are broadly consistent with the optimal benchmark. We discuss a range of explanations for nearly uniform pricing, highlighting managerial inertia and brand image concerns as mechanisms frequently mentioned by industry participants. Relative to our optimal benchmark, uniform pricing may significantly increase the prices paid by poorer households relative to the rich, dampen the response of prices to local economic shocks, alter the analysis of mergers in antitrust, and shift the incidence of intranational trade costs. JEL Codes: D9, L1, L2, M31.