Is Money Essential? An Experimental Approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jiang, Janet Hua; Norman, Peter; Puzzello, Daniela; Sultanum, Bruno; Wright, Randall
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Zhejiang University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/730199
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2972-2998
• 关键词: Correlated equilibria; exchange; Currency; bubbles; credit; POLICY; games; MODEL

摘要

Monetary exchange is called essential when better outcomes become incentive compatible when money is introduced. We study essentiality theoretically and experimentally using finite-horizon monetary models that are naturally suited to the lab. Following mechanism design, we also study the effects of strategy recommendations both when they are incentive compatible and when they are not. Results show that output and welfare are significantly enhanced by fiat currency if monetary equilibrium exists but not otherwise. Also, recommendations help if incentive compatible but not otherwise. Sometimes money gets used when it should not, and we investigate why, using surveys and measures of social preferences.