Estimating an Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marra, Marleen
• 署名单位: Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734722
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1932-1974
• 关键词: sequential estimation; network externalities; reserve prices; identification; equilibrium; MARKET; uncertainty; commissions; COMPETITION; QUALITY

摘要

This paper develops and estimates a structural auction platform model with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers to study the welfare impacts of fee changes. Estimates from a new wine auction dataset illustrate the striking feature of two-sided markets that some users can be made better off despite paying higher fees. The results also underscore the importance of addressing seller selection when endogenizing (buyer) entry onto auction platforms. Quantifying the welfare effects from (anticompetitive) fee changes through a model that accounts for important user interactions enables antitrust policy to be applied to such markets.