Colluding against Workers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delabastita, Vincent; Rubens, Michael
• 署名单位: Radboud University Nijmegen; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734780
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1796-1839
• 关键词: Monopsony; collusion; markups

摘要

Empirical models of labor market competition usually assume that employers set wages noncooperatively, despite frequent allegations of collusive employer behavior. We propose an identification approach for labor market collusion that relies on production and cost data, and we use it to study how employer collusion affected wage markdowns of 227 Belgian coal firms between 1845 and 1913. We are able to detect collusion through the 1897 coal cartel without ex ante knowledge of its timing and find that it explains the fast growth in markdowns after 1900. We find that the cartel decreased both wages and employment by 6% to 17%.