WHAT DO CONSUMERS CONSIDER BEFORE THEY CHOOSE? IDENTIFICATION FROM ASYMMETRIC DEMAND RESPONSES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abaluck, Jason; Adams-Prassl, Abi
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjab008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1611-1663
• 关键词: medicare part d; consideration sets; CHOICE EVIDENCE; MODEL; INFORMATION; selection; search; Heterogeneity; Inattention; SALIENCE

摘要

Consideration set models generalize discrete-choice models by relaxing the assumption that consumers consider all available options. Determining which options were considered has previously required either survey data or restrictions on how attributes affect consideration or utility. We provide an alternative route. In full-consideration models, choice probabilities satisfy a symmetry property analogous to Slutsky symmetry in continuous-choice models. This symmetry breaks down in consideration set models when changes in characteristics perturb consideration. We show that consideration probabilities are constructively identified from the resulting asymmetries. We validate our approach in a lab experiment where consideration sets are known and then apply our framework to study a smart default policy in Medicare Part D, wherein consumers are automatically reassigned to lower-cost prescription drug plans with the option of opting out. Full-consideration models imply that such a policy will be ineffective because consumers will opt out to avoid switching costs. Allowing for inattention, we find that defaulting all consumers to lower-cost options produces negligible welfare benefits on average, but defaulting only consumers who would save at least $300 produces large benefits.