An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akbarpour, Mohammad; Budish, Eric; Dworczak, Piotr; Kominers, Scott Duke
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Chicago; Northwestern University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjad022
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 359-417
• 关键词: optimal allocation; auction; DESIGN; SYSTEM; tax

摘要

We propose an economic framework for determining the optimal allocation of a scarce supply of vaccines that become gradually available during a public health crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Agents differ in observable and unobservable characteristics, and the designer maximizes a social welfare function over all feasible mechanisms-accounting for agents' characteristics, as well as their endogenous behavior in the face of the pandemic. The framework emphasizes the role of externalities and incorporates equity as well as efficiency concerns. Our results provide an economic justification for providing vaccines immediately and for free to some groups of agents, while at the same time showing that a carefully constructed pricing mechanism can improve outcomes by screening for individuals with the highest private and social benefits of receiving the vaccine. The solution casts light on the classic question of whether prices or priorities should be used to allocate scarce public resources under externalities and equity concerns.