Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, MO; Wilkie, S
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00342.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 543-566
• 关键词: collective action; externalities; equilibrium; DELEGATION; CONTRACTS; agents; MODEL

摘要

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.