What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balafoutas, Loukas; Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rds049
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 876-891
• 关键词: competition; reputation; ECONOMICS

摘要

Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behaviour by sellers. This article presents a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. We find that passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on significantly longer detours, while lack of information on the local tariff system increases the likelihood of manipulated bills by about fifteen percentage points. Passengers' perceived income seems to have no effect on fraud.