Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, E. D.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdt023
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 112-136
• 关键词: Evolutionary games

摘要

We report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3x3 games with intransitive best responses. Each moment, each player is matched against the entire population, here 8 human subjects. A heat map offers instantaneous feedback on current profit opportunities. In the continuous slow adjustment treatment, we see distinct cycles in the population mix. The cycle amplitude, frequency and direction are consistent with the standard learning models. Cycles are more erratic and higher frequency in the instantaneous adjustment treatment. Control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or no cycles. Average play is approximated fairly well by Nash equilibrium, and an alternative point prediction, TASP (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon), captures some regularities that Nash equilibrium misses.