Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bierbrauer, Felix J.; Hellwig, Martin F.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw015
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1440-1464
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; incomplete information; income taxation; compatibility; DESIGN; implementation; collusion; uncertainty; schemes; rules

摘要

We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of robust coalition-proofness as well as robust incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public good provision can only depend on the level of the public good that is provided and that level can only depend on the population shares of people favouring one level over another. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit the outcome depends on whether or not the share of votes in favour of provision exceeds a specified threshold. With more provision levels for the public good, more complicated mechanisms can be used but they still involve the counting of votes rather than any measurement of the participants' willingness to pay. The article thus provides a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms.