Estimating Strategic Models of International Treaty Formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wagner, Ulrich J.
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv054
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1741-1778
• 关键词: Bilateral investment treaties; pure public good; environmental agreements; voluntary provision; economic-determinants; cfc emissions; equilibrium; montreal; game; PARTICIPATION

摘要

This article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties. A treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period. The net benefit of treaty membership increases over time. Spillovers among members and non-members accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute, respectively. The predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters, based on a cross section of treaty ratification dates. With this approach, I estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic interaction in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in the formation of Europe's preferential trade agreements, and in the growth of Germany's network of bilateral investment treaties. Through a series of counterfactual experiments, I explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the formation of these treaties.