Information Revelation in Relational Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fong, Yuk-Fai; Li, Jin
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw035
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 277-299
• 关键词: performance-appraisal; moral hazard; Subjective evaluation; incentive contracts; repeated games; BIAS; observability; ratings

摘要

We explore subjective performance reviews in long-term employment relationships. We show that firms benefit from separating the task of evaluating the worker from the task of paying him. The separation allows the reviewer to better manage the review process, and can, therefore, reward the worker for his good performance with not only a good review contemporaneously, but also a promise of better review in the future. Such reviews spread the reward for the worker's good performance across time and lower the firm's maximal temptation to renege on the reward. The manner in which information is managed exhibits patterns consistent with a number of well-documented biases in performance reviews.