Informative Cheap Talk in Elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartik, Navin; Van Weelden, Richard
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdy009
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 755-784
• 关键词: electoral competition; MODEL; reputation; selection; nixon; go

摘要

Why do office-motivated politicians sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with their electorate's? Can non-congruent statements convey any information about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements? Furthermore, can electoral campaigns also directly affect an elected official's behaviour? We develop a model of credible cheap talkcostless and non-binding communicationin elections. The foundation is an endogenous voter preference for a politician who is known to be non-congruent over one whose congruence is sufficiently uncertain. This preference arises because uncertainty about an elected official's policy preferences generates policymaking distortions due to reputation/career concerns. We show that cheap talk can alter the electorate's beliefs about a politician's policy preferences and thereby affect the elected official's behaviour. Informative cheap talk can increase or decrease voter welfare, with a greater scope for welfare benefits when reputation concerns are more important.