Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alesina, Alberto; Piccolo, Salvatore; Pinotti, Paolo
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Bocconi University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Bergamo; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdy036
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 457-499
• 关键词: budget cycles; mafia; PROTECTION; GOVERNMENT; ELECTIONS; BUSINESS; SCOPE

摘要

We develop a model explaining how criminal organizations strategically use pre-electoral violence as a way of influencing electoral results and politicians' behaviour. We then characterize the incentives to use such violence under different levels of electoral competition and different electoral rules. Our theory is consistent with the empirical evidence within Sicily and across Italian regions. Specifically, the presence of organized crime is associated with abnormal spikes in violence against politicians before electionsparticularly when the electoral outcome is more uncertainwhich in turn reduces voting for parties opposed by criminal organizations. Using a very large data set of parliamentary debates, we also show that violence by the Sicilian Mafia reduces anti-Mafia efforts by members of parliament appointed in Sicily, particularly from the parties that traditionally oppose the Mafia.