Commitment in Organizations and the Competition for Talent

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooley, Thomas; Marimon, Ramon; Quadrini, Vincenzo
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa008
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2165-2204
• 关键词: Moral hazard; CONTRACTS; COMPENSATION; RISK

摘要

We show that a change in organizational structure from partnerships to public companies-which weakens contractual commitment-can lead to higher investment in high return-and-risk activities, higher productivity (value added per employee) and greater income dispersion (inequality). These predictions are consistent with the observed evolution of the financial sector where the switch from partnerships to public companies has been especially important in the decades that preceded the 21st Century financial crisis.