Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac071
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1865-1892
• 关键词: Tournament; participants; probability; regret

摘要

We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on-agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insertion sort that allows a self-interested committee chair with no knowledge of how votes will be cast to do as well as if she had complete knowledge. Strategies with this regret-freeness property are characterized by their efficiency, and by their avoidance of two intuitive errors. What distinguishes regret-free strategies from each other is how they prioritize among alternatives; insertion sort prioritizes lexicographically.