Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ostrizek, Franz; Shishkin, Denis
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac070
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2042-2082
• 关键词: self-control; CHOICE; music; MODEL; temptation; judgments; monopoly

摘要

We study a decision-framing design problem: a principal faces an agent with frame-dependent preferences and designs an extensive form with a frame at each stage. This allows the principal to circumvent incentive compatibility constraints by inducing dynamically inconsistent choices of the sophisticated agent. We show that a vector of contracts can be implemented if and only if it can be implemented using a canonical extensive form, which has a simple high-low-high structure using only three stages and the two highest frames, and employs unchosen decoy contracts to deter deviations. We then turn to the study of optimal contracts in the context of the classic monopolistic screening problem and establish the existence of a canonical optimal mechanism, even though our implementability result does not directly apply. In the presence of naive types, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs.