Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Magnolfi, Lorenzo; Roncoroni, Camilla
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac058
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2006-2041
• 关键词: Incomplete information; correlated equilibrium; multiple equilibria; confidence-regions; empirical-analysis; choice models; dynamic-games; wal-mart; identification; inference

摘要

We propose a method to estimate static discrete games with weak assumptions on the information available to players. We do not fully specify the information structure of the game but allow instead for all information structures consistent with players knowing their own payoffs. To make this approach tractable, we adopt as a solution concept Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE). We characterize the sharp identified set under BCE and unrestricted equilibrium selection, and find that in simple games with limited variation in covariates identified sets are informative. In an application, we estimate a model of entry in the Italian supermarket industry and quantify the effect of large malls on local supermarkets. Estimates and predictions differ from those obtained under more restrictive assumptions.