Asymmetric Information between Employers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kahn, Lisa B.
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.5.4.165
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 165-205
• 关键词: human-capital investment; wage; FIRMS; DISCRIMINATION; promotion; DYNAMICS; mobility; careers; workers

摘要

This study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms.