Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Autor, David; Duggan, Mark; Gruber, Jonathan
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.6.4.110
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 110-141
• 关键词: applicants; earnings; unemployment; regressors; receipt; HEALTH; models; rolls

摘要

Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities.