Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saez, Emmanuel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.1.204
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 204-228
• 关键词: Charitable contributions; PARTICIPATION; subsidies; rebate; plan

摘要

We examine the effects of presentation and information on the takeup of financial subsidies for retirement saving in a large randomized experiment carried out with H&R Block. The subsidies raise take-up and contributions with larger effects when the subsidy is characterized as a matching contribution rather than an equivalent-value tax credit (or cash back), and when filers are informed before the tax season about the subsidy. The results imply that both pure incentives and the presentation of those incentives affect consumer choices. (JEL D14, H24, H31, J26)