A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brueckner, Jan K.; Selod, Harris
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; The World Bank; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.1.28
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 28-51
• 关键词: PROPERTY-RIGHTS; INVESTMENT; security; cities; Slums; FIRMS; INDIA; PUNE

摘要

This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters squeeze the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies. (JEL O15, Q15, R14)