Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stefanadis, Christodoulos
• 署名单位: University of Piraeus
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.4.148
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 148-172
• 关键词: monopolistic competition; allocation; returns; scale; POWER

摘要

In producer-friendly economies-economies that are ruled by productive agents and have strong property rights institutions-international trade causes an institutional improvement and an aggregate shift of talent towards production, and away from socially wasteful appropriation. However, in predator-friendly economies-economies that are ruled by rent seekers and have weak institutions-international trade leads to an institutional deterioration, and a more unfavorable talent allocation.