Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen; Kopczuk, Wojciech
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.1.54
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 54-90
• 关键词: Welfare; insurance; Workfare; taxation; DESIGN; MODEL; tax

摘要

We model complexity in social programs as a by-product of the screening process. While a more rigorous screening process may improve targeting efficiency, the associated complexity is costly to applicants and induces incomplete take-up. We integrate the study of take-up with the study of rejection (Type I) and award (Type II) errors, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers choose screening intensity (and complexity), an eligibility rule, and a benefit level. Consistent with many real-world programs, optimal programs feature high complexity, incomplete take-up, classification errors of both Type I and II and, in some cases, excessive benefits. (JEL D04, D82, H23, I18, I38)