Capital Income Taxes with Heterogeneous Discount Rates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Diamond, Peter; Spinnewijn, Johannes
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.4.52
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 52-76
• 关键词: taxation

摘要

With heterogeneity in both skills and discount factors, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem that savings should not be taxed does not hold. In a model with heterogeneity of preferences at each earnings level, introducing a savings tax on high earners or a savings subsidy on low earners increases welfare, regardless of the correlation between ability and discount factor. Extending Emmanuel Saez (2002), a uniform savings tax increases welfare if that correlation is sufficiently high. Key for the results is that types who value future consumption less are more tempted by a lower paid job. Some optimal tax results and empirical evidence are presented. (JEL D14, H21, H24)