Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Niehaus, Paul; Sukhtankar, Sandip
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.4.230
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 230-269
• 关键词: enforcement; audits

摘要

Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents-for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this golden goose effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter.