Targeting with Agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Niehaus, Paul; Atanassova, Antonia; Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Nielsen Holdings Inc.; University of Chicago; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.1.206
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 206-238
• 关键词: poverty-alleviation; decentralization; program; ACCOUNTABILITY; performance; CORRUPTION; governance; transfers; delivery; capture

摘要

Targeting assistance to the poor is a central problem in development. We study the problem of designing a proxy means test when the implementing agent is corruptible. Conditioning on more poverty indicators may worsen targeting in this environment because of a novel tradeoff between statistical accuracy and enforceability. We then test necessary conditions for this tradeoff using data on Below Poverty Line card allocation in India. Less eligible households pay larger bribes and are less likely to obtain cards, but widespread rule violations yield a de facto allocation much less progressive than the de jure one. Enforceability appears to matter. (JEL D12, I32, I38, O12, O15)