Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Kinnan, Cynthia; Larreguy, Horacio
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Tufts University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20150057
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 43-78
• 关键词: Repeated games; RISK; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; insurance; COMMITMENT; altruism; exchange; CHOICE

摘要

Lack of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social proximity and network centrality may affect cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted - high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects' partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners' relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. While socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement, distant pairs do not. Individuals with more central partners behave more cooperatively without enforcement. Capacity for cooperation in the absence of contract enforcement therefore depends on the subjects' network position.