Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ito, Koichiro
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130397
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 209-237
• 关键词: regression discontinuity designs; energy; respond; prices; POLICY; cash

摘要

Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. Such policy designs create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. I investigate the implications of such policies by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program. Using household-level panel data, I find that the incentive produced precisely estimated zero treatment effects on energy conservation in coastal areas. In contrast, the rebate induced short-run and long-run consumption reductions in inland areas. Income, climate, and air conditioner saturation significantly drive the heterogeneity. Finally, I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis and investigate how to improve the policy design.