Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kahn, Matthew E.; Li, Pei; Zhao, Daxuan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; National University of Singapore; Agency for Science Technology & Research (A*STAR); A*STAR - Institute of High Performance Computing (IHPC); National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130367
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 223-242
• 关键词: quality; spillovers

摘要

At political boundaries, local leaders have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and thus incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. We document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at province boundaries. Heavy metal pollutants, not targeted by the central government, have not decreased in concentration after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms.