Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lewis, Matthew S.; Pflum, Kevin E.
• 署名单位: Clemson University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 243-274
• 关键词: technology choice; COMPETITION; OWNERSHIP; ANTITRUST; price; MODEL

摘要

We investigate the impact of hospital system membership on negotiations between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs). Previous research finds that system hospitals secure higher reimbursements by exploiting local market concentration. By leveraging system membership in the bargaining game, however, system hospitals may also extract a higher percentage of their value to an MCO. Our findings reveal that more of the observed price gap between system and nonsystem hospitals can be attributed to bargaining power differences than to differences linked to relative concentration. These results highlight the importance of explicitly modeling the bargaining process when evaluating negotiated-price markets more generally. (JEL C78, I11, I13, L14)