Tax Compliance and Loss Aversion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engstrom, Per; Nordblom, Katarina; Ohlsson, Henry; Persson, Annika
• 署名单位: Uppsala University; University of Gothenburg
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130134
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 132-164
• 关键词: reference-dependent preferences; prospect-theory; income; experience; ECONOMICS; DECISION; evasion; utility; MARKET; field

摘要

We study if taxpayers are loss averse when filing returns. Preliminary deficits might be viewed as losses assuming zero preliminary balances as reference points. Swedish taxpayers can to try to escape such losses by claiming deductions after receiving information about the preliminary balance. Using a regression kink and discontinuity approach, we study data for 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers for 2006. There are strong causal effects of preliminary tax deficits on the probability of claiming deductions. Compliance will increase and auditing costs will be reduced if preliminary taxes are calibrated so that most taxpayers receive refunds.