Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dwenger, Nadja; Kleven, Henrik; Rasul, Imran; Rincke, Johannes
• 署名单位: University Hohenheim; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150083
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 203-232
• 关键词: Prosocial behavior; impure altruism; incentives; evasion; ENFORCEMENT; frictions; SALIENCE; taxation; audit

摘要

We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.