Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deserranno, Erika
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20170670
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 277-317
• 关键词: DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; performance pay; PRODUCTIVITY; expectations; preferences; INFORMATION; SALIENCE; WORKER

摘要

I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential applicants. To this end, I create experimental variation in expected earnings and use that to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates' perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community and discourage agents with strong pro-social preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better.