Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mironov, Maxim; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina
• 署名单位: IE University; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20140188
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 287-321
• 关键词: ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS; connections; Indonesia; audits; taxes; COSTS; theft

摘要

We provide evidence of corruption in allocation of public procurement and assess its efficiency. Firms with procurement revenue increase tunneling around regional elections, whereas neither tunneling of firms without procurement revenue, nor legitimate business of firms with procurement exhibits a political cycle. Data are consistent with the corruption channel-cash is tunneled to politicians in exchange for procurement contracts-and inconsistent with alternative channels. Using the strength of correlation between procurement revenue and tunneling around elections as a proxy for local corruption, we reject the efficient grease hypothesis: in more corrupt localities, procurement contracts go to unproductive firms.