Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hanna, Rema; Wang, Shing-Yi
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150029
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 262-290
• 关键词: social preferences; developing-countries; CORRUPTION; BEHAVIOR; incentives; motivation; HEALTH; sector; allocation; deception

摘要

Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.