Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA's Clean Power Plan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bushnell, James B.; Holland, Stephen P.; Hughes, Jonathan E.; Knittel, Christopher R.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150237
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 57-90
• 关键词: electricity; emissions; MARKETS; IMPACT

摘要

The EPA's Clean Power Plan sets goals for CO2 emissions rate reductions by 2030 that vary substantially across states. States can choose the regulatory mechanism they use and whether or not to join with other states in implementing their goals. We analyze incentives to adopt rate standards versus cap-and-trade with theory and simulation. We show conditions where adoption of inefficient rate standards is a dominant strategy from both consumers' and generators' perspectives. Numerical simulations of the western electricity system highlight incentives for uncoordinated policies that lower welfare and increase emissions relative to coordination.