Tenure in Office and Public Procurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coviello, Decio; Gagliarducci, Stefano
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Rome Tor Vergata
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150426
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 59-105
• 关键词: regression discontinuity design; electoral accountability; CORRUPTION; incentives; ELECTIONS

摘要

We study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement using a dataset on Italian municipal governments. To identify a causal relation, we first compare elections where the incumbent mayor barely won or barely lost another term. We then use the introduction of a two-term limit, which granted one potential extra term to mayors appointed before the reform. The main result is that an increase in tenure is associated with worse procurement outcomes. Our estimates are informative of the possibility that time in office progressively leads to collusion between government officials and local bidders.